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Abstract 
 
This study examines conditional financial development from information sharing in 53 African 
countries for the period 2004-2011, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile 
regressions (QR) which enable the assessment of the effect of information sharing throughout the 
conditional distributions of financial development dynamics. The policy relevance of the QR 
approach builds on the motivation that blanket policies on the role of information sharing in 
financial development may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of 
financial development and tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate and high 
levels of financial development.  Information sharing is measured with private credit bureaus 
(PCB) and public credit registries (PCR) while financial development is proxied with dynamics 
of depth, efficiency, activity and size. The following findings are established. First, for financial 
depth, while there is a positive threshold effect from PCR in money supply and liquid liabilities, 
the effect from PCB is mixed. Second, for financial efficiency, there is a: (i) contemporary 
positive threshold from PCR and mixed effect from PCB in banking system efficiency and (ii) 
U-shape and positive threshold from PCR and PCB respectively in financial system efficiency. 
Third, for financial activity, there are consistent positive thresholds from PCR and PCB in 
banking system activity and financial system activity. Fourth, there are negative thresholds from 
PCR and PCB in financial size.  Positive thresholds are consistent incremental financial 
development rewards from PCR and/or PCB with increasing financial development and vice-
versa for negative thresholds. Mixed effects are characterised by S-shaped, Kuznets or wave-like 
patterns. As a main policy implication, initial conditions in financial development are essential to 
materialise incremental benefits from PCR and PCB. Other policy implications are discussed.  
 
JEL Classification: G20; G29; O16; O55; C52 
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1. Introduction  
Access to finance in Africa has been substantially hampered by concerns of surplus 
liquidity (Saxegaard, 2006; Asongu, 2014a, p.70). Over the past decade and a half, the African 
financial intermediary landscape has witnessed the introduction of private credit bureaus (PCB) 
and public credit registries (PCR) as instruments of information sharing in order to mitigate 
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers (Triki & Gajigo, 2014). The prime 
motivation for introducing these information sharing offices (ISO)1 has been to mitigate moral 
hazard and adverse selection in bank lending. Accordingly, policies favouring underlying ISO 
have built on substantially documented evidence that basic financial access is constrained by a 
series of factors that are endogenous to information asymmetry, notably: affordability, physical 
access and eligibility to bank lending (Batuo & Kupukile, 2010; Allen et al., 2011). In essence, 
ISO play the role of brokers in financial intermediation. Hence, by sharing information, ISO 
facilitate: increased credit and market competition, reduced credit constraints and efficient 
capital allocation (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002). Unfortunately, recent evidence suggests that, inter 
alia: (i) the concern about surplus liquidity is still very severe in African financial institutions 
(Fouda, 2009) and (ii) PCR and PCB are weighing negatively on financial intermediary 
development on the continent (Asongu et al., 2015). In essence, the relationship between the 
sharing of information and bank lending has been an open debate in empirical and theoretical 
literature (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002)2.   
In light of the above, one may reasonably infer that financial institutions on the continent 
have been taking advantage of ISO to pursue a ‘quiet life’3: using shared information from ISO 
for higher profits margins instead of intermediation efficiency4. To the best of our knowledge, 
the interesting body of literature (which we substantially engage in Section 2) on the role of ISO 
in financial development has left room for improvement in at least three areas, notably, the need: 
                                                          
1 We use ISO interchangeably with ‘PCB and PCR’ throughout the study.   
2 “On the whole, all three models agree on the prediction that information sharing (in one form or another) reduces 
default rates, whereas the prediction concerning its eﬀect on lending is less clear-cut” (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002, p. 
2020).  
3 Quiet life is the short form of the Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH). According to Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010), the 
QLH is an assumption that financial establishments with relatively higher market power would invest little in 
pursuing financial intermediation efficiency. On the contrary, they would use their advantage to grant fewer loans at 
affordable prices to borrowers because they would rather prefer to exploit opportunities for higher profit margins or 
a ‘quiet life.  
4 Financial intermediation efficiency within the context of mitigating surplus liquidity refers to the ability of banks 
to transform mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators.  
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to narrow inquiries to scopes with severe issues of financial access; for holistic financial 
development indicators and to account for initial conditions in financial development.  
 First, on the scope front, despite the substantially documented issues of surplus liquidity 
in Africa, as far as we have reviewed, little scholarly focus has been devoted to the continent 
experiencing the most acute concerns of limited financial access. Moreover, studies on the 
continent have been limited in scope with a selected number of countries. Galindo and Miller 
(2001) have involved no African country. Love and Mylenko (2003) have positioned their 
inquiry on four countries.  Barth et al. (2009) have targeted nine countries. Triki and Gajigo 
(2014) have focused on 42 countries for the period 2006-2009. This line of inquiry focuses on 53 
African countries for the period 2004-2011. Positioning the inquiry on Africa is essentially due 
to the scarce literature in the area, despite evolving concerns about whether financial institutions 
on the continent have been tailoring information from ISO to enhancing allocation activity and 
efficiency (Triki & Gajigo, 2014) and recommendations for more scholarly research on the 
subject (Singh et al., 2009, p. 13).  
 Second, on the measurement of financial development, it is interesting to note that the 
broad and African-specific literatures on information asymmetry (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 
2010; Houston et al., 2010) and information sharing have specifically been oriented towards the 
measurement of constraints in access to finance. We steer clear of the mainstream literature by 
employing all financial dimensions documented by the Financial Development and Structure 
Database (FDSD) of the World Bank. These include financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, 
activity and size. We have already observed that the fundamental aim of ISO is to boost financial 
intermediation efficiency. Increasing efficiency by reducing informational rents and boosting 
competition ultimately results in more financial activity or lending (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993, p. 
2019). It should be noted that financial efficiency is generally the ratio of financial activity to 
financial depth (credit/deposit ratio). 
Third, on the need to account for initial levels of financial development, we argue that 
blanket policies of financial development from modelling exercises based on mean values of the 
dependent variable are unlikely to be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of 
financial development and tailored differently across countries with high- medium- and low-
levels of financial development. The underpinning idea is that certain initial conditions of 
financial development may be required for the benefits of financial development from 
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information sharing by ISO. To the end, any resulting threshold effect (in terms of increasing or 
decreasing marginal returns from ISO estimates) should validate the hypothesis of initial 
conditions and hence, avail more room for policy implications. The use of quantile regressions to 
account for initial conditions steers clear of two studies closest to the present line of inquiry, 
which have based their empirical strategies on mean values of financial development, notably: 
Triki and Gajigo (2014) and Asongu et al. (2015) have respectively adopted Probit models and 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM).   
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 covers the theoretical and 
empirical literature. The data and methodology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the 
results and discussions while Section 5 concludes with implications.  
 
2. Theoretical highlights and empirical literature  
 Consistent with Claus and Grimes (2003), there are two main strands in the literature 
documenting the theoretical basis for an association between information sharing and existence 
of financial intermediaries. The first strand articulates the provision of liquidity by financial 
intermediaries whereas the second is concerned with the ability of financial intermediaries to 
transform the risk features of assets. Both strands build on the fundamental role of financial 
intermediation which is to increase allocation efficiency by mitigating the cost of channelling 
mobilised resources from borrowers to lenders.  Corresponding theories on the role of financial 
intermediaries build on the literature of imperfect market information. In essence, financial 
intermediaries have the primary task of reducing information and transaction costs arising from 
information asymmetry (IA) between borrowers and lenders. Hence, the relevance of ISO build 
on the need for mechanisms by which the mitigation of IA can be enhanced in the financial 
sector.  
Consistent with Asongu et al. (2015), a substantial bulk of empirical studies on IA has 
focused on: the role of information sharing among creditors and the impacts of creditors’ rights 
to more information. The latter has principally been concerned with the influence of stronger 
creditors’ rights in, inter alia: (i) bank risk-taking by Houston et al. (2010) and Acharya et al. 
(2011); (ii) bankruptcy with notable works from Claessens and Klapper (2005), Djankov et al. 
(2007) and Brockman and Unlu (2009) and (iii) capital structure by El Ghoul et al. (2012). The 
former strand has been concerned with assessing how reducing IA: enhances the availability of 
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credit (Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014); reduces defaulting rates 
(Jappelli & Pagano, 2002); decreases the cost of credit (Brown et al., 2009); affects antitrust 
intervention (Coccorese, 2012); influences corrupt lending (Barth et al., 2009) and affects bank 
loans that are syndicated (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010).  
 Noticeably, the engaged literature is skewed towards developed and developing countries 
where issues of financial access are comparatively less severe. In other words, whereas a 
substantial body of literature has focused on the Organisation of Economic Cooperation (OECD) 
economies and the emerging countries of Latin America and Asia, not much is known about 
Africa: a continent that has been documented to host firms and citizens with comparatively lower 
levels of access to finance (Asongu et al., 2015).  
Galindo and Miller (2001) investigate macroeconomic evidence on the underlying issues 
to conclude that relatively advanced economies with credit registries enjoy less financial 
restrictions compared to less developed economies with credit bureaus. In particular, well- 
performing PCR contribute substantially to firms’ decreasing sensitivity to investment decisions 
for ‘cash flows availability’: a typical financial constraint proxy.  The authors also establish that 
there has been about a 50% performance reduction by credit registries, notably: on the sensitivity 
of investment decisions to internal funds.  
  Love and Mylenko (2000) have used a combination credit registries (privates and public) 
and  of firm-oriented data from the World Bank Business Environment Survey (WBES) to assess 
two main concerns, notably: whether as a result of more financial sharing from banks and the 
perception of managers, credit registries are negatively related to constraints in the financing of 
credit. The results have shown that PCB are associated with lower financing constraints and  a 
higher sharing of financing from banks, while PCR do not have any significant effect on 
reducing financing constraints.  
Barth et al. (2009) have examined the effect of: (i) information sharing and (ii) borrower 
and lender competition on ‘lending corruption’ via ISO using WEBS from 56 countries covering 
4000 firms and private credit in 129 countries. The authors reveal two main results. First, 
corruption in lending is mitigated by banking competition and information sharing plays a 
positive role in the mitigating effect. Second, the ownership structure of firms and banks, firm 
competition and the legal environment have substantial impacts on corrupt lending.  
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Triki and Gajigo (2014) have assessed two main concerns: the effect of ISO in firms’ 
access to finance and the impact of the design of PCR on the degree of financing constraint. 
Their results reveal that:  financial access is relatively higher in economies with PCB compared 
to those with PCR or no ISO and substantial heterogeneity exists in access to finance and the 
design of ISO with PCR, among countries.  
Asongu et al. (2015) have examined policy thresholds of information sharing in financial 
development and concluded on the following.  PCB and PCR exert negative impacts on financial 
depth, with the relatively higher magnitude from the latter. PCB has a negative effect on banking 
system efficiency while the impact of PCR is insignificant. PCB and PCR both have negative 
effects on financial activity, with a higher magnitude from the former. Effects of ISO are positive 
on financial size, with the impact from PCB lower in magnitude.  
As discussed in the introduction, the present line of inquiry complements the engaged 
literature in three main dimensions, notably, in the need to narrow inquiries to scopes with severe 
issues of financial access; for holistic financial development indicators; and to account for initial 
conditions in financial development. To these ends, the empirical evidence is based on 53 
African countries, using all dimensions identified by the financial development and structure 
database of the World Bank and quantile regressions to articulate existing levels of financial 
development in the investigated nexuses.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 Consistent with Asongu et al. (2015), we investigate a panel of 53 African countries with 
data for the period 2004-2011 from the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) 
and African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank. The starting- and ending-year are 
constrained by data availability. In line with the motivation of the inquiry, financial indicators 
from the FDSD are transformed to obtained variables of depth, efficiency, activity and size. The 
computation which is consistent with Asongu (2013) is also motivated by the need to avail room 
for more policy implications.  
 First, financial depth encompasses: (i) financial system deposits (Fdgdp) or liquid 
liabilities and (ii) overall-economic depth (M2/GDP) denoting the monetary base plus time, 
savings and demand deposits. It is important to distinguish these measures because a great chunk 
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of the monetary base in African countries circulates outside the formal financial sector. Second, 
financial intermediation efficiency in the context of this study refers to the ability of financial 
institutions to fulfil their fundamental mission of converting mobilised resources into credit for 
economic operators. Two indicators are used, namely: (i) financial-system-efficiency (‘financial 
system credit on financial system deposits: Fcfd’) and (ii) banking-system-efficiency (with bank 
credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’). Third, financial intermediary activity represents the ability of 
banks to grant credit to economic operators. Two measurements are used to this end, namely: (i) 
financial system activity (with ‘private credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions: 
Pcrbof”) and (ii) banking system activity (with ‘private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb’). 
Fourth, financial size is measured as the ratio of ‘deposit bank assets’ to ‘total assets’ (‘deposit 
bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets’: Dbacba).  
 In accordance with Asongu et al. (2015), control variables include: foreign aid, trade, 
GDP growth, public investment and inflation. The covariates have also been amply documented 
in financial development studies (Huang, 2005; Osabuohein et al., 2013; Asongu, 2014b). First, 
like with remittances (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Efobi et al., 2014), development assistances that is 
utilised effectively in recipient countries and survives the capture of consultancy services in 
donor countries, has a high likelihood of improving financial development in the recipient 
countries.  
 Second, a substantial body of the literature has concluded on a positive growth-finance 
nexus (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 199; Saint-Paul, 1992). Consistent with this bulk of studies, 
economic growth is generally linked to reducing financial intermediation cost, resulting from 
intensive competition which involves an increasing bulk of financial resources allocated for 
investment purposes. In addition, the relevance of income levels in financial development is 
abundant in the broad (Levine, 1997) and African-specific (Asongu, 2012) literatures. 
Accordingly, whereas Asongu (2012) has established that higher income levels are associated 
with higher levels of financial development in Africa, Jaffee and Levonian (2001) had long 
concluded that income levels have a positive effect on banking system structure. Conversely, 
growth associated with financial crises may decrease financial development (Asongu, 2015). 
 Third, a strand in the literature is supportive of the view that openness-friendly policies 
(especially in trade) are likely to engender a positive outcome in financial development (Do & 
Levchenko, 2004; Huang & Temple, 2005). Fourth, the relationship between financial 
 9 
development and investment has been investigated by Huang (2011) who has established a 
positive link. Fifth, some principal domestic macroeconomic policies like the maintenance of 
higher investment and low/stable inflation are conducive for financial development (Huybens & 
Smith, 1999; Boyd et al., 2001; Huang, 2011). In essence, Boyd et al. (2001) on the one hand 
and  Huybens and Smith (1999) on the other hand, have respectively empirically and 
theoretically established that countries with higher/chaotic inflation are very likely to be 
rewarded with less active, smaller and less efficient financial institutions.  
 Note should taken of the fact that, expected signs of discussed covariates cannot be 
established with certainty because the underpinning financial variables are conflicting by 
definition and measurement. For instance, the second variable or financial intermediation 
efficiency is defined and appreciated as the ratio of the third (financial activity) and first 
(financial depth), notably: credit/deposit ratio.  
Sources and definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1, the summary statistics in 
Appendix 2, whereas the correlation matrix is disclosed in Appendix 3. Two points are note 
worthy from the summary statistics: the means of variables are comparable and the substantial 
degree of variation is an indication that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge. The 
objective of the correlation matrix is to mitigate potential concerns of multicollinearity that could 
considerably bias estimated coefficients.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
We have motivated this inquiry with the need to account for initial levels of financial 
development. For this purpose, we are consistent with conditional development literature (Billger 
& Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012) in examining the effect of ISO on financial development 
throughout the distributions of financial development dynamics (Keonker & Hallock, 2001). 
Previous studies on information sharing have assessed the nexus between ISO and 
financial development by reporting parameter estimates at the conditional mean of financial 
access indicators (Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2015). While mean effects are important, 
we extend the underlying stream of ISO literature by employing a QR technique which 
distinguishes initial levels of financial development. Moreover, whereas Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS)-related regressions are founded on the hypothesis that errors terms and financial 
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development variables are normally distributed, the QR strategy is not based on such an 
assumption of normally distributed error terms.  
The QR technique estimates parameters at mutliple points of the conditional distribution 
of financial development. Hence, the strategy aligns with our motivation to distingush countries 
of low- medium- and high-initial financial development using contemporary and non-
contemporary quantile regressions. In essence, the policy relevance of the QR approach builds 
on the motivation that blanket policies on the role of information sharing in financial 
development may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of financial 
development and tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of 
financial development. 
The  th quantile estimator of a financial development dynamic is obtained by solving for 
the optimization problem in Eq. (1), which is disclosed without subscripts for ease of 
presentation and simplicity.  
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Where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For instance 
the 25th or 75th quantiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) by approximately weighing the 
residuals. The conditional quantile of financial development or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (2) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation is 
analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are examined only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of financial development. For the model in Eq. (2) the 
dependent variable iy  is a financial development indicator while ix  contains a constant term, 
foreign aid, trade, GDP growth, public investment and inflation. 
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4. Empirical Analysis  
4.1 Presentation of results  
 Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively present findings corresponding to financial dynamics of 
depth, efficiency, activity and size. While the left-hand-side (LHS) of tables corresponds to 
contemporary estimations, the right-hand-side (RHS) entails non-contemporary regressions. The 
interest of lagging the independent variables in the RHS by one year is to have some bite on 
endogeneity (see Mlachila et al., 2014, p. 21). Consistent differences in ISO estimated 
coefficients between OLS and quantiles (in terms of sign, significance and magnitude of 
significance) justify the relevance of adopted empirical strategy.  
 Given that the effects of ISO are examined throughout the conditional distributions of 
underlying financial development dynamics, corresponding tendencies may take several patterns, 
namely: U-shape, inverted U-shape, S-shape and positive or negative threshold shapes. 
Thresholds within the context of this study are in accordance with Asongu (2014b). Positive 
thresholds are established when corresponding estimates from ISO consistently display 
decreasing negative magnitudes and/or increasing positive magnitude throughout the conditional 
distributions of a given financial development dynamic. Conversely, negative thresholds are 
denoted by consistent increasing negative or decreasing positive magnitudes from estimated ISO 
coefficients. Hence, evidence of a threshold tendency confirms the intuition of modelling based 
on initial financial development conditions, with the view that financial development benefits 
from information sharing may consistently increase or decrease concurrently with increasing 
initial levels of financial development.  
 From Table 1, the following findings can be established. First, the positive threshold 
effect from PCR is consistent across panels and non-contemporary specifications. Second, the 
impact of PCB is mixed, with a: negative threshold between the 0.10th and 0.75th quantiles on the 
LHS of Panel A; (ii) Kuznets-shape with a negative threshold from the 0.25th to the 0.75th 
quantile on the RHS of Panel A and (iii) a consistent S-shape from the 0.10th to the 0.75th 
quantile on the LHS and RHS of Panel B. Third, most of the significant control variables have 
the expected signs. (i) Inflation negatively affects financial depth because it is high with a mean 
value of 7.801 (see Appendix 1). (ii) Public investment has a positive effect probably because 
investments from the public sector circulate through formal financial establishments and hence, 
increase money supply.  (iii) The effect of trade is positive and negative contingent on specific 
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quantiles. (iv) The negative effect of foreign aid is likely due to development assistance 
disbursements captured in donor countries (for consultancy, bureaucracy, purchase of 
commodities…etc) and only thinly reaching recipient countries. It could also be due to massive 
corruption schemes associated with development assistance, such that foreign aid does not 
benefit domestic money supply because it is surreptitiously funnelled back to tax havens in 
developed countries by the ruling elite. (v) The negative effect of growth is consistent with 
Asongu et al. (2015).   
 
Table 1: Financial Depth and Information Sharing    
             
 Financial Depth  
 Panel A: Overall Economic Depth (Money Supply) 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  35.43*** 18.927*** 19.601*** 17.579*** 30.570*** 72.410*** 36.240*** 20.596*** 20.417*** 17.783*** 29.837*** 67.571** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
PCR 1.419*** 0.359*** 1.591*** 1.427*** 1.831*** 2.074*** 1.520*** 0.787*** 1.652*** 1.906*** 1.928*** 2.127*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.003) 
PCB 0.202*** 0.394*** 0.389*** 0.296*** 0.175* 0.069 0.192*** 0.386*** 0.395*** 0.330*** 0.198** 0.110 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.840) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.784) 
GDP growth  -0.442* -0.110 -0.236 -0.630*** -0.597** 0.093 -0.359 -0.103 -0.266* -0.360* -0.475** 0.297 
 (0.054) (0.612) (0.210) (0.000) (0.028) (0.916) (0.166) (0.774) (0.053) (0.066) (0.018) (0.746) 
Inflation -0.045*** 0.023* 0.011 -0.014 -0.040 -0.114 -0.068** 0.021 0.007 -0.021 -0.060*** -0.116 
 (0.008) (0.054) (0.339) (0.172) (0.160) (0.206) (0.015) (0.256) (0.465) (0.192) (0.003) (0.301) 
Public Invt.  0.188 0.042 0.187 0.949*** 1.210*** -0.260 0.125 -0.014 0.238** 0.455*** 0.872*** -0.188 
 (0.503) (0.882) (0.202) (0.000) (0.000) (0.733) (0.675) (0.948) (0.043) (0.009) (0.000) (0.805) 
Foreign Aid  -0.492*** 0.009 0.055 -0.052 -0.516** -1.232 -0.531*** -0.067 0.048 -0.009 -0.335** -1.173 
 (0.005) (0.932) (0.483) (0.253) (0.022) (0.307) (0.003) (0.581) (0.445) (0.927) (0.044) (0.394) 
Trade  -0.015 -0.074*** -0.054*** 0.043*** 0.001 -0.101 -0.009 -0.076*** -0.057*** 0.065** 0.028 -0.095 
 (0.658) (0.004) (0.006) (0.000) (0.969) (0.546) (0.805) (0.009) (0.000) (0.016) (0.412) (0.619) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.250 0.123 0.139 0.208 0.229 0.246 0.252 0.122 0.149 0.203 0.223 0.239 
Fisher  20.10***      17.83***      
Observations  293 293 293 293 293 293 257 257 257 257 257 257 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Depth (Liquid Liabilities) 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  25.878*** 11.572*** 14.759*** 9.642*** 20.395*** 55.189*** 26.550*** 10.856** 14.928*** 10.567*** 20.267*** 59.695*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) 
PCR 1.418*** 0.453*** 1.277*** 1.432*** 1.791*** 2.033*** 1.514*** 0.524*** 1.366*** 1.804*** 1.730*** 2.110*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PCB 0.423 0.527*** 0.475*** 0.534*** 0.552*** 0.254 0.425*** 0.524*** 0.509*** 0.556*** 0.540*** 0.238 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.366) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.484) 
GDP growth  -0.254 -0.047 -0.241** -0.274** -0.598*** -0.069 -0.194 -0.041 -0.174 -0.251 -0.377** 0.054 
 (0.220) (0.904) (0.026) (0.047)) (0.000) (0.935) (0.409) (0.926) (0.348) (0.207) (0.021) (0.944) 
Inflation -0.016 0.038** 0.015 0.004 -0.025 -0.090 -0.032 0.040 0.018 -0.002 -0.040 -0.110 
 (0.225) (0.023) (0.124) (0.793) (0.107) (0.211) (0.139) (0.105) (0.173) (0.895) (0.011) (0.287) 
Public Invt.  0.269 0.201 -0.001 0.615*** 1.183*** -0.136 0.244 0.131 0.044 0.661*** 0.846*** -0.256 
 (0.279) (0.228) (0.991) (0.000) (0.000) (0.829) (0.375) (0.413) (0.785) (0.000) (0.000) (0.690) 
Foreign Aid  -0.389** 0.080 0.134** 0.038 -0.331*** -0.983 -0.429*** -0.032 0.096 0.006 -0.260** -1.059 
 (0.011) (0.564) (0.041) (0.619) (0.006) (0.313) (0.006) (0.814) (0.292) (0.951) (0.045) (0.346) 
Trade  -0.018 -0.079** -0.042** 0.057*** 0.025 -0.043 -0.011 -0.062 -0.044** 0.046* 0.050* -0.065 
 (0.588) (0.019) (0.014) (0.002) (0.290) (0.734) (0.742) (0.105) (0.044) (0.080) (0.078) (0.669) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.323 0.138 0.147 0.218 0.300 0.273 0.323 0.136 0.156 0.222 0.294 0.263 
Fisher  29.68***      27.91***      
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Observations  293 293 293 293 293 293 257 257 257 257 257 257 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial depth  is least. PCR: 
Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus.  
 
 The following findings can be established in relation to Table 2 on financial efficiency. 
First, with respect to banking system efficiency in Panel A: (i) there is a positive threshold effect 
from PCR (0.25th to 0.90th quantile)  and S-shape from PCB on the LHS and (ii) positive wave-
like patterns from PCR and Kuznets-shape (with a median peak) from PCB in the RHS. Second, 
in relation to financial system efficiency in Panel B: (i) there are consistent U-shapes (with 
median troughs) and positive thresholds from PCR and PCB respectively across contemporary 
and non-contemporary regressions.  
 With regard to Table 3 on the relationship between information sharing and financial 
activity, but for some thin exceptions, there are consistent positive thresholds across: panels, 
ISO, and ‘contemporaneous character of specifications’. Exceptions include:  0.90th quantiles of 
PCB specifications in Panel A and  0.90th quantile of PCR on the LHS of Panel B.  
 The following finding can be established for Table 4 on contemporary and non-
contemporary linkages between ISO and financial size. But for a thin exception (0.90th quantile 
of PCR), there is an overwhelming evidence of negative thresholds (or decreasing positive 
magnitude).  
 The significant control variables in Tables 2 have signs that are somewhat contrasting 
with Tables 1 and 3 because the measurement of financial allocation efficiency (in Table 2) is 
broadly the ratio of financial activity (in Table 3) to financial depth (in Table 1). As we have 
alluded to, financial efficiency is the ability of financial institutions to transform mobilised 
resources (deposits) into credit (activity). The significant control variables in Table 4 have signs 
that are broadly consistent with the discourse provided for those in Table 1. 
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Table 2: Financial Efficiency and Information Sharing    
             
             
 Financial Efficiency 
 Panel A: Banking System Efficiency  
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  88.266*** 47.101*** 75.782*** 94.267*** 106.87*** 99.890*** 87.063*** 49.241*** 73.944*** 90.644*** 101.68*** 122.36*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 1.077*** 1.296*** 1.109*** 1.116*** 1.301*** 2.187*** 1.273*** 1.348*** 1.363*** 1.193*** 1.713*** 1.158*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) 
PCB 0.581*** 0.355*** 0.475*** 0.760*** 0.709*** 0.692*** 0.555*** 0.455*** 0.490*** 0.716*** 0.659*** 0.358* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) 
GDP growth  0.430 0.792*** 0.731 -0.105 -0.231 0.662 0.492 1.299*** 0.794* 0.299 -0.129 0.055 
 (0.226) (0.001) (0.126) (0.760) (0.631) (0.517) (0.160) (0.000) (0.067) (0.412) (0.878) (0.956) 
Inflation -
0.0005*** 
0.0008*** 0.0001 -
0.0004*** 
-0.001*** -0.001** -0.029* 0.023*** -0.045*** -0.010 -0.026***   -
0.044*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.447) (0.004) (0.000) (0.010) (0.099) (0.000) (0.004) (0.211) (0.000) (0.001) 
Public Invt.  -0.814** -0.484* -1.178*** -0.255 -0.600 -0.580 -0.767** -0.384 -1.183*** -0.433 -0.514 -0.973 
 (0.024) (0.080) (0.004) (0.411) (0.169) (0.684) (0.028) (0.439) (0.002) (0.182) (0.226) (0.284) 
Foreign Aid  -0.178 0.208 -0.277 -0.311 -0.374 0.233 -0.136 0.175 0.098 -0.214 -0.384* -0.644 
 (0.313) (0.349) (0.329) (0.128) (0.129) (0.711) (0.408) (0.553) (0.707) (0.294) (0.073) (0.132) 
Trade  -0.209*** -0.157*** -0.229*** -0.309*** -0.249*** -0.141 -0.199*** -0.206*** -0.232*** -0.272*** -0.190*** -0.166 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.326) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.175) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.215 0.140 0.126 0.149 0.151 0.152 0.221 0.157 0.135 0.136 0.155 0.156 
Fisher  17.20***      8.82***      
Observations  298 298 298 298 298 298 264 264 264 264 264 264 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Efficiency  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  100.67*** 43.217*** 80.296*** 101.36*** 117.03*** 116.93*** 98.998*** 46.012*** 76.460*** 99.955*** 113.10*** 114.63*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 1.177*** 1.250*** 1.046*** 0.923*** 1.339*** 2.377*** 1.360*** 1.367*** 1.213*** 1.148*** 2.274*** 2.279*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB 1.313*** 0.384*** 0.477*** 1.063*** 2.245*** 2.743*** 1.347*** 0.417*** 0.452*** 0.887*** 2.432*** 2.678*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.193 0.953*** 0.690 -0.547** -0.643 0.300 0.503 1.351*** 1.190*** 0.168 -0.292 0.269 
 (0.656) (0.000) (0.161) (0.048) (0.318) (0.810) (0.234) (0.000) (0.002) (0.546) (0.707) (0.814) 
Inflation -0.107* -0.053** -0.258*** -0.095*** -0.130 -0.069 -0.183* -0.141*** -0.601*** -0.244*** -0.131*** -0.155* 
 (0.061) (0.030) (0.000) (0.005) (0.207) (0.390) (0.096) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.071) 
Public Invt.  -0.881** -0.373 -1.158** -0.210 -0.055 -0.804 -0.924** -0.257 -0.830 -0.525** -0.186 -0.575 
 (0.046) (0.163) (0.014) (0.393) (0.922) (0.611) (0.041) (0.490) (0.050) (0.041) (0.787) (0.728) 
Foreign Aid  -0.258 0.293 -0.284 -0.374** -0.325 -0.011 -0.232 0.264 -0.081 -0.291* -0.296 -0.065 
 (0.211) (0.164) (0.338) (0.019) (0.318) (0.986) (0.229) (0.393) (0.752) (0.096) (0.431) (0.292) 
Trade  -0.333*** -0.137*** -0.249*** -0.343*** -0.428*** -0.270* -0.321*** -0.184*** -0.244*** -0.334*** -0.384*** -0.254 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.101) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.373 0.131 0.123 0.157 0.227 0.375 0.385 0.144 0.134 0.146 0.237 0.409 
Fisher  10.08***      8.38***      
Observations  293 293 293 293 293 293 257 257 257 257 257 257 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial efficiency is least. PCR: 
Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus.  
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Table 3: Financial Activity and Information Sharing    
             
             
 Financial Activity 
 Panel A: Banking System Activity 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  22.642*** 6.838*** 8.135*** 13.054*** 17.085*** 47.120*** 22.969*** 7.325*** 9.273*** 12.303*** 18.938*** 40.258*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
PCR 1.545*** 0.318*** 1.441*** 1.964*** 2.076*** 2.167*** 1.719*** 0.317*** 1.528*** 2.069*** 2.203*** 2.601*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB 0.576*** 0.337*** 0.433*** 0.630*** 0.969*** 0.696*** 0.583*** 0.353*** 0.428*** 0.647*** 0.894*** 0.759*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDP growth  -0.079 -0.025 -0.058 -0.233** 0.107 -0.390 0.017 -0.019 -0.012 -0.053 0.272 -0.104 
 (0.602) (0.765) (0.754) (0.025) (0.488) (0.357) (0.920) (0.859) (0.961) (0.734) (0.155) (0.829) 
Inflation -0.029* 0.014*** 0.005 -0.013 0.002 -0.081** -0.051** -0.0008 -0.022 -0.011 -0.021 -0.082 
 (0.051) (0.003) (0.715) (0.322) (0.881) (0.049) (0.046) (0.932) (0.462) (0.388) (0.244) (0.136) 
Public Invt.  -0.235* 0.130** -0.022 0.125 0.013 -0.675* -0.276** 0.101 -0.056 0.097 -0.173 -0.641 
 (0.058) (0.016) (0.868) (0.194) (0.921) (0.082) (0.033) (0.125) (0.721) (0.475) (0.294) (0.208) 
Foreign Aid  -0.302*** 0.023 0.121 0.042 -0.081 -0.652 -0.325*** -0.004 0.078 0.030 -0.115 -0.492 
 (0.006) (0.606) (0.221) (0.514) (0.480) (0.211) (0.003) (0.939) (0.450) (0.738) (0.397) (0.444) 
Trade  -0.053** -0.047*** -0.038 -0.035** -0.027 -0.079 -0.048* -0.046*** -0.0365 -0.024 -0.027 -0.060 
 (0.022) (0.000) (0.111) (0.021) (0.216) (0.303) (0.051) (0.000) (0.174) (0.253) (0.336) (0.560) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.481 0.151 0.168 0.274 0.387 0.424 0.488 0.154 0.176 0.278 0.391 0.430 
Fisher  27.14***      22.42***      
Observations  293 293 293 293 293 293 257 257 257 257 257 257 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Activity  
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  27.368*** 6.604*** 7.898*** 12.785*** 15.214*** 48.359*** 27.611*** 7.885*** 8.419*** 11.568*** 19.545*** 44.891*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 1.633*** 0.324*** 1.432*** 1.935*** 2.241*** 2.199*** 1.824*** 0.348*** 1.546*** 2.038*** 2.343*** 2.604*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB 0.990*** 0.339*** 0.425*** 0.632*** 1.791*** 2.012*** 1.034*** 0.350*** 0.448*** 0.646*** 1.933*** 2.085*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.045 -0.024 -0.059 -0.235 0.042 -0.269 0.071 -0.020 -0.017 -0.139 0.123 -0.0006 
 (0.816) (0.797) (0.740) (0.037) (0.800) (0.482) (0.756) (0.848) (0.930) (0.385) (0.643) (0.999) 
Inflation -0.027 0.016*** 0.008 -0.012   0.008 -0.076** -0.052* -0.006 -0.056** -0.011 -0.023 -0.082 
 (0.100) (0.003) (0.574) (0.417) (0.640) (0.048) (0.080) (0.517) (0.020) (0.403) (0.321) (0.141) 
Public Invt.  -0.191 0.133** 0.027 0.124 0.037 -0.643 -0.261 0.107 -0.049 0.159 -0.158 -0.648 
 (0.233) (0.033) (0.846) (0.246) (0.804) (0.102) (0.131) (0.160) (0.694) (0.264) (0.501) (0.213) 
Foreign Aid  -0.359*** 0.035 0.112 0.080 0.019 -0.653 -0.379*** 0.008 0.134* 0.079 -0.079 -0.535 
 (0.003) (0.495) (0.214) (0.251) (0.875) (0.175) (0.002) (0.887) (0.097) (0.379) (0.686) (0.403) 
Trade  -0.118*** -0.046*** -0.038* -0.034** -0.023 -0.094 -0.113*** -0.052*** -0.031 -0.022 -0.032 -0.103 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.074) (0.036) (0.352) (0.185) (0.003) (0.000) (0.131) (0.311) (0.433) (0.313) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.476 0.133 0.146 0.233 0.355 0.509 0.490 0.135 0.153 0.234 0.365 0.512 
Fisher  18.29***      14.63***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 259 259 259 259 259 259 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial activity  is least. PCR: 
Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus.  
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Table 4: Financial Size and Information Sharing    
             
             
 Financial Size 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  76.946*** 41.723*** 72.267*** 84.675*** 95.776*** 97.082*** 76.047*** 40.072*** 70.173*** 85.563*** 95.744*** 97.120*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 0.640*** 0.734* 0.526*** 0.412*** 0.375*** 0.380*** 0.704*** 0.940* 0.524* 0.497*** 0.334*** 0.309*** 
 (0.000) (0.068) (0.008) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.079) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB 0.336*** 0.667*** 0.347*** 0.209*** 0.112*** 0.102*** 0.328*** 0.703*** 0.377*** 0.185** 0.101*** 0.080*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.195 -0.325 -0.696** -0.235 -0.151* -0.055 0.014 0.050 -0.333 -0.032 -0.019 0.035 
 (0.438) (0.662) (0.016) (0.323) (0.053) (0.402) (0.957) (0.943) (0.431) (0.895) (0.785) (0.550) 
Inflation -0.079** -0.195*** -0.079*** -0.104*** -0.063*** -0.068*** 0.0005*** 0.001*** 0.0006*** 0.0002*** -0.00001 -0.0001*** 
 (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.736) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  0.824*** 0.934* 0.498** 0.559*** 0.353*** 0.240*** 0.728*** 0.971*** 0.464* 0.499** 0.288*** 0.204** 
 (0.000) (0.052) (0.028) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.054) (0.025) (0.000) (0.010) 
Foreign Aid  -0.647*** -0.135 -1.058*** -0.727*** -0.800*** -0.353*** -0.590*** -0.170 -0.734*** -0.779*** -0.761*** -0.355*** 
 (0.000) (0.695) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.402) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade  0.015 0.139 0.084*** 0.025 -0.008 -0.010 0.024 0.110* 0.075* 0.021 -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.610) (0.118) (0.007) (0.413) (0.504) (0.324) (0.423) (0.071) (0.087) (0.512) (0.583) (0.494) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.327 0.200 0.245 0.240 0.230 0.151 0.291 0.189 0.223 0.223 0.198 0.120 
Fisher  53.17***      50.41***      
Observations  294 294 294 294 294 294 262 262 262 262 262 262 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial size  is least. PCR: 
Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus.  
 
 
4.2 Further discussion  
 We engage this section in four main strands, namely discussion on: the ‘quiet life 
hypothesis’ (QLH); comparative assessment with existing literature; and relevance of findings in 
the post-2015 development agenda. 
 First, the established positive effects of ISO on financial development (especially from 
dynamics of efficiency, activity and size) attest to a non-acceptance of the QLH5. Hence, it is 
reasonable to infer that African financial institutions are taking advantage of ISO to improve 
financial access across the continent. This inference does not negate the fact that underlying 
financial institutions are also using ISO to increase their profit margins. In essence, financial 
access and increasing profit margins move hand-in-glove. In line with the fundamental 
objectives of ISO, we might be tempted to go a step further to inferring that ISO are relevant in 
stimulating competition and mitigating the abuse of market power by big banks, notably through: 
reducing informational rents, sharing information to stimulate competition and rendering credit 
markets contestable (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993, p. 2019). The overwhelming positive role of ISO 
                                                          
5 In our view, non-acceptance is preferable to rejection because, the cost and profit functions of financial institutions 
have to be assessed for a genuine assessment of the QLH in the African banking industry. 
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in financial access is also a response to an evolving stream of African business literature which is 
consistent on the position that lack of financial access is one of the most important challenges to 
doing business on the continent (Bartels et al., 2009; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Tuomi, 2011; 
Darley, 2012).  It follows that encouraging ISO in Africa would improve financial access. 
Second, it is important to discuss our findings in the light of engaged literature. (1) They 
are consistent with Singh et al. (2009) who have concluded that countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
which promote information sharing by means of ISO are very likely to experience higher levels 
of private domestic credit as a share of GDP (or financial activity). (2)  Our results are also 
broadly consistent with Galindo and Miller (2001) in the perspective that economies with 
relatively improved credit registries enjoy less financial restrictions compared to their 
counterparts with less developed ISO. (3) The comparative conclusions from Love and Mylenko 
(2003) on the one hand and Triki and Gajigo (2014) on the other hand, are only thinly confirmed. 
Accordingly, the former has established that availability of PCB is associated with lower 
financing constraints and higher share of bank financing while the presence of PCR do not exert 
any significant effect on underlying constraints. Triki and Gajigo (2014) on their part have 
concluded that financial access is averagely higher in economies with PCB compared to those 
with PCR or neither institution. Based on our findings, the relative importance of PCB vis-à-vis 
PCR: (i) cannot be confirmed for financial size; (ii) can be confirmed exclusively at the 0.10th 
quantiles of financial activity (banking and financial system perspectives); (iii) are verifiable 
only in top distributions of financial system efficiency and (iv) holds water exclusively at the 
0.10th quantiles of contemporary money supply and liquid liabilities. (4) The results of the study 
only partially confirm Asongu et al. (2015) who have found a positive ISO-finance nexus 
exclusively in relation to financial size.  
 Third, consistent with the post-2015 development agenda, it would be interesting if 
policy could employ ISO to mitigate information asymmetry not just for ‘financial access’ but 
also for ‘inclusive financial access’. This recommendation essentially builds on three counts: (i) 
finance is needed to boost growth (Asongu, 2015); (ii) inclusive finance is essential for quality of 
growth, which entails poverty and income-inequality reductions (Asongu & De Moor, 2015) and 
(iii) an April 2015 World Bank report has revealed that poverty has been decreasing in all 
continents of the world with the exception of Africa (World Bank, 2015), despite the continent 
having experienced two decades of growth resurgence (Fosu, 2015). Therefore while according 
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to the World Bank, 45% of countries in sub-Saharan Africa are off-track from achieving the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target, tailoring ISO for ‘inclusive 
financial access’ would go a long way to helping retarded countries catch-up during the post-
2015 sustainable development agenda.  
   
5. Conclusion, policy implications and future research directions  
The purpose of this study has been to examine conditional financial development from 
information sharing in African countries using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile 
regressions. In summary, the following findings have been established. First, for financial depth, 
while there is a positive threshold effect from private credit registries (PCR) in money supply 
and liquid liabilities, the effect from public credit bureaus (PCB) is mixed. Second, for financial 
efficiency, there is a: (i) contemporary positive threshold from PCR and mixed effect from PCB 
in banking system efficiency and (ii) U-shape and positive threshold from PCR and PCB 
respectively in financial system efficiency. Third, for financial activity, there are consistent 
positive thresholds from PCR and PCB in banking system activity and financial system activity. 
Fourth, there are negative thresholds from PCR and PCB in financial size.  Positive thresholds 
are defined as decreasing negative or increasing positive magnitudes from information sharing 
offices (ISO) estimates and vice-versa for negative thresholds. Mixed effects are characterised by 
S-shaped, Kuznets or wave-like patterns.  
 Four main inferences are note worthy from the results. First, African financial institutions 
are taking advantage of ISO to improve financial access across the continent. Second, initial 
conditions in financial development are essential to materialise incremental benefits from PCR 
and PCB. Third, increasing ISO across the continent could address one of the most important 
challenges to doing business in Africa: the lack of financial access. Fourth, sampled countries 
could tailor ISO to mitigate information asymmetry not exclusively for ‘financial access’ but 
also for ‘inclusive financial access’ in accordance with challenges of the post-2015 African 
development agenda.  
 The main policy implication from the study is that information sharing increases financial 
system depth (deposits), financial system activity (credit) as well as financial allocation 
efficiency or the ability of financial intermediaries to transform underlying mobilised deposits 
into credit for economic operators. Therefore, ISO can be tailored towards reducing surplus 
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liquidity issues on the continent by enhancing financial allocation efficiency with more 
proportionate action on countries with low initial levels of financial development. Accordingly, 
ISO could benefit from increased synchronisation of information by means of updated 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) and ‘knowledge economy’ (KE)-driven 
human resources in order to tackle voluntary and involuntary holding of surplus liquidity by 
African financial institutions.  
First, as concerns, voluntary holding of surplus liquidity, underlying ICT- and KE-
orientations would enhance the ability of ISO to: (i) ease constraints of banks in updating their 
positions in central banks so that they are not required to keep reserves above statutory limits; 
(ii) overcome transportation issues that oblige bank branches in remote zones to hold excess 
reserves; and (iii) ease interbank lending, especially for purposes of contingency.   
Second, ISO with the underlying instruments could also be tailored towards avoiding 
involuntary holding of excess liquidity by: (i) dwarfing the inability of financial institutions to 
lend in scenarios of regulated interest rates; (ii) facilitating investment of banks in bond markets; 
(iii) increasing lending competition between banks; and (iv) broadening investment opportunities 
for banks in regional stock markets. Underlying ICT and KE instruments include, inter alia: 
reliable high-speed internet access and state of the art information systems in banks and ISO; 
regular training of ISO staff; recruitment of more qualified personnel and capitalization on 
mobile banking for inclusive development benefits. 
 In order to enhance financial sector development, regional/continental catch-up that is 
essential for policy harmonization, in the implementation of above suggested policies, more 
priority should be given to countries with low initial levels of development. This is essentially 
because we have established for the most part that beneficial effects from ISO increase more 
proportionately with higher levels of financial development.  
Future inquires devoted to improving extant literature in light of the sustainable 
development agenda could focus on, inter alia: assessing mechanisms by which ISO can 
promote ‘inclusive financial’ access and examining instruments with which the inclusive effects 
of ISO can be consolidated.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics (2004-2011) 
  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
 
 
Financial 
Development 
Economic Financial Depth (M2) 34.279 22.294 6.363 112.83 377 
Financial System Depth (Fdgdp)  28.262 21.066 2.926 92.325 377 
Banking  System Efficiency (BcBd)  68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 72.722 35.884 22.200 252.88 377 
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 21.571 24.154 0.010 149.77 379 
Financial Size (Dbacba) 78.073 20.255 4.032 99.949 399   
       
Information 
Asymmetry   
Public Credit Registries (PCR) 2.155 5.812 0 49.8 381 
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 4.223 13.734 0 64.8 380 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.996 4.556 -17.66 37.998 404 
Inflation 7.801 4.720   0 43.011 357 
Public Investment 74.778 1241.70 -8.974 24411 387 
Development Assistance  10.396 12.958 0.027 147.05 411 
Trade Openness (Trade) 80.861 32.935 24.968 186.15 392 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit 
on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit 
from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. GDPg: GDP 
growth.  
.  
 21 
        Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size: 291) 
           
Financial Development Dynamics     
    Info. Asymmetry Other variables  
Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size        
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Prcb Pcrbof Dbacba PCR PCB GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade  
1.000 0.970 0.094 0.103 0.821 0.629 0.398 0.416 0.147 -0.104 -0.080 0.055 -0.295 0.140 M2 
 1.000 0.130 0.220 0.886 0.754 0.452 0.409 0.303 -0.091 -0.063 0.070 -0.320 0.149 Fdgdp 
  1.000 0.859 0.490 0.495 0.243 0.154 0.303 -0.016 -0.144 -0.169 -0.133 -0.176 Bcbd 
   1.000 0.583 0.743 0.242 0.067 0.510 -0.056 -0.097 -0.149 -0.179 -0.189 FcFd 
    1.000 0.922 0.478 0.448 0.439 -0.092 -0.089 -0.055 -0.343 0.093 Pcrb 
     1.000 0.413 0.293 0.556 -0.088 -0.073 -0.057 -0.324 0.019 Pcrbof 
      1.000 0.249 0.343 -0.061 -0.142 0.198 -0.403 0.210 Dbacba 
       1.000 -0.140 -0.026 -0.081 0.068 -0.154 0.207 PCR 
        1.000 -0.101 -0.035 -0.047 -0.329 0.084 PCB 
         1.000 -0.169 0.129 0.122 0.037 GDPg 
          1.000 -0.081 -0.0004 -0.006 Inflation  
           1.000 0.059 0.130 PubIvt 
            1.000 -0.309 NODA 
             1.000 Trade 
               
          M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks.  
          Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. Info: Information. PCR: Public Credit 
          Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Info: Information.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
Economic Financial Depth   M2 Money Supply (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Depth   Fdgdp Liquid Liabilities (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking System Efficiency   BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Efficiency   FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking  System Activity  Prcb Private domestic credit from deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Activity Prcbof Private domestic credit from financial institutions (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial Size   Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank 
assets 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Information Asymmetry  PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
   
PCB Private credit bureau coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
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